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AN APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF A CONFLICT SITUATION 
WITH n PARTICIPANTS 
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(Received February 4, 1972) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Various papers have been devoted to the problem of finding suitable solution of a 
conflict situation with n participants, where n ^ 3 (see e.g. [2], [3]). The authtors usu­
ally try to find a deterministic preference group order, which is reasonable or acceptable 
from a certain point of view (e.g. it satisfies some of the five Arrow's axioms described 
in [2], [3]). Besides the deterministic preference order, the probabilistic preference 
order theory has been described as well (see e.g. [2]). In this article an attempt is 
made to find in a sense reasonable probabilistic preference group order. The criterion 
of reasonability or acceptability of the group ordering selected is the value of a real 
function / (the so called function of discontent) defined on a set of feasible group 
decision rules, each of which determines a probabilistic preference ordering on a 
given set of alternatives. The value /(P), where P is a decision rule, characterizes 
numerically the discontent of the group of n participants in the conflict situation 
with the decision rule P. The decision rules which minimize the value of the function 
/ on the set of feasible group decision rules are supposed to be reasonable for the 
whole group and can be recommended to a leader of the group as a "reasonable" 
dictate". The situation considered is that when a member of the given group of n 
persons must be appointed leader. The members of the group who tend to minimize 
the value of the discontent function /, if selected, are called reasonable dictators 
(the set @r(f)
 m l n e text of the article). It is supposed that @r(f) + ©• The problem 
of choosing the "most suitable reasonable dictator" (in a certain sense described 
further) is also considered. A small numerical example is solved. The approach 
suggested can be interpreted, using Arrow's terminology, as a kind of "reasonable 
dictatorship principle". 
The corresponding theoretical basis from [1] is given for completeness in Appendix. 
2. AN APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF A CONFLICT S I T U A T I O N -
MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION 
Suppose M is a set of alternatives which is common to a given set N = {l, 2, ..., n} 
of n persons — participants of a conflict situation (the concept of the conflict situation 
will be defined later). Let X be the set of all binary relations which are weak orders 
on M, and let ^(X) be the set of all simple probability measures defined on X (see 
Appendix, Definition 4A). Suppose 9" is a topology on g?(X) such that (&(X)9 9") 
is a Hausdorff topological space. Let <t (i = 1, 2, ..., n) be a binary relation defined 
on the space (&(X)9 <T)9 which satisfies the following four conditions: 
(1) <t is a weak order on t?(X); 
(2) (P <t Q, 0 < a < 1) => aP + (1 - a) R <t aQ + (1 - a) R 
for every P, Q9 Re $>(X); 
(3) (P<iQ>Q<iR)*><*P + (l-*)R<iQ9 Q<tocP + (1 -x)R 
for every P, Q9 Re 0>(X) and for some a, p e (0, 1); 
(4) { P | P e ^ ( K ) , P<iQ}eFy {P\P e 0>(X)9 Q <{P) e «T , 
for every Q e &>(X). 
Theorems 3 A, 4A and Remark 1A from Appendix imply that for each i e N under 
the conditions (1) —(4) there exists a real, valued continuous function ut defined on 
&(X) such that 
(5) P<iQ if and only if ut(P) < ut(Q) 
for every P, Q e 0>(X). 
Suppose now that &X(X) is a compact subset in the space (^(X)9 9~). We define 
for all ieN the sets &i9 ^{ £ ^\(X) as follows: 
#* = {Q\ut{Q)= max u{P)} . 
Pe&i(X) 
Because of continuity of ut and compactness of ^i(X) it is &t + 0 for for all i e N. 
Suppose that P£ e M{ is a fixed element, chosen by the i-th person. 
Let us suppose that the real-valued function f is defined on ^(X) as follows: 
(6) f(P) = mzxai\ul{P)-ul{Pi)\9 
ieN 
where af are non-negative real numbers. The function f will be called „function of 
discontent.". 
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Suppose that 0>2(X) is a compact subset in the space (0>(X), ST). Since the function 
/ is continuous on CJ>2(X), the set 
R(&2(X),f) = {Q | /(e) = min f(P)} 
Pe@2(X) 
is a non-empty compact subset of 0>2(X). 
We shall assume further that for each i e N a mapping Ff from J^ into ^ 2 P 0 
is given. We shall call this mapping "election mapping".1) Let @r(f) be a set defined 
as follows: 
(7) ajj) = (i | i EN, Ffa) = <M(0>2(X),f)} . 
We shall assume further that Mr(f) =j= 0. 
Let cp be the following real-valued function defined on the set N: 
(8) cp(i) = min a.|M.(P) - u,(P,.)| 
Pe@(&2(X).f) 
for every i e N. 
Suppose 
^ ( f > (P) = ti\ <KJ) = min <K0} < 
i6!Vn^ r( / ) 
Now we are ready to introduce the following definitions: 
Definition 1. The (3n + 6)-tuple Sf = {M,0><x, ..., <n, ux, ..., un, Fx, ..., Fn, 
0>X(X), 0>2(X),f, cp] is called the conflict situation with n participants (persons). 
Definition 2. Suppose that Sf is a given conflict situation with n participants. The 
elements of 0>(X) are called decision rules, the set 0>X(X) is called the set of feasible 
decision rules for an individual (single person), the set 0>2(X) is called the set 
of feasible decision rules for the group N. 
Definition 3. Let Sf be a given conflict situation with n participants. The elements 
of the set M(0>2(X),f) are called reasonable decision rules. An arbitrary element 
of the set @r(f) is called a reasonable dictator, and an arbitrary element of the set 
Dr(f,(p) is called a suitable reasonable dictator. 
Definition 4. Suppose that Sf is a given conflict situation with n participants. 
The Cartesian product !M(0>2(X),f) x 9)r(f,(p) is called the solution set of the 
conflict situation Sf\ the elements of the solution set are called solutions of the 
conflict situation Sf\ 
l) The election mapping Ft can be interpreted as a mapping which reflects the change in the 
behaviour of the i-th person, if this person is appointed leader of the given group of n persons. 
A more detailed discussion is given in paragraph 3. We could write also Ff(^j( cz M(^2(X),f) 
in (7). A slight change in the further text would then be needed. 
83 
Remark 1. The solution of the conflict situation Sf is thus a pair (P; j), where 
P e 0t(02(X),f), j e @r(f, (p). Therefore, the solution (P; j) shows us a reasonable 
decision rule for the whole group of n participants ("a resonable dictate") and a person 
who can choose this reasonable decision rule, if appointed leader of the group. 
Theorem 1. Let Sf he an arbitrary conflict situation with n participants in the 
sense of Definition i. Suppose $)r(f) ={= 0. Then there exists a solution of thesconflict 
situation SP in the sense of Definition 4. 
Proof. The conflict situation 0 is defined in such a way that conditions (1), (2), 
(3), (4) are satisfied and 0X(X\ 02(X) are compact sets in the space (0(X), ST). 
Thus there exist continuous real-valued functions ut satisfying (5) (this holds accord-
ing to Theorem 3A, Remark 1A and Theorem 4A from Appendix). The function f 
defined by (6) is then also a continuous real-valued function on (0(X), ST) and 
hence the set 0t(02(X),f) is a non-empty (compact) set in (0(X), ST). We have 
assumed 9r(f) 4= 0, Thus the set 9r(f, <p) is non-empty, too. Therefore 01(0 2(X), f) x 
x Q)r(f, cp) 4= 0 and each element of this set is a solution of the conflict situation Sf 
in the sense of Definition 4. So we have proved that under the conditions of the 
theorem there exists at least one solution of the conflict situation Sf. 
3. INTERPRETATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION 
The element of M. The elements of the set M can be interpreted as alternatives. 
The set M is supposed to be common to all participants of the conflict situation 
under consideration. 
The elements of X. The elements of X are binary relations on M. These elements 
are supposed to be weak orders on M and can thus be interpreted as various pre-
ference relations on M. If B e X, the (x, y) e B for some (x, y) e M x M is written 
also as xBy and it is read "x is better than y". 
The elements of 0(X). The elements of 0(X) can be interpreted as probabilistic 
decision rules for "judging" the alternatives from the set M. If P e 0(X), BeX, 
then the number P(B) is equal to the probability with which the altetnatives from 
M will be judged in accordance with the preference order B. If x, y e M, then the 
probability of the event "x is preferred to j / " under the decision rule P e 0(X) is 
equal to the number 
X P(B) , where S£ = {B I B e X, xBy] . 
To choose an element P e 0(X) is thus equivalent to the choice of a probabilistic 
preference order (in the sense of [2]). Let us notice that the number of non-zero 
elements in the sum mentioned above is finite (Theorem 1A in Appendix). The inter-
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pretation of the elements of 0*i(X) and 0*2(X) is clear from Definition 2. It follows 
from this definition that in most cases of conflict situations it will be probably 
^i(X) ~~ &2(X) (the leader has at his disposal at least all individual feasible decision 
rules). The element Pt e ^t is one of the best decision rules of the i-th participant. 
The function of discontent f. The number/(P) can be interpreted as a numerical 
measure of discontent of the whole group N with the decision rule P. The number oct 
are various "weights" of the participants of the conflict situation. If all but one a/s 
are equal to zero, we obtain the pure dictatorship (in Arrow's sense, see [2]). 
The election mapping Fr We assume that the conflict situation is solved in such 
a way that one of the n participants must be appointed leader of the group N. The 
mapping F, is supposed to describe how the decision making of the i-th person in 
the group N is influenced by the election of this person to a leading position. 
The set @r(f). The set @r(f) is interpreted as a set of "reasonable dictators", i.e. 
the set of persons who tend to minimize the value off if appointed. In the leaders 
theory described in Paragraph 2 we supposed that &r(f) 4= 0. 
The function (p. The number (p(i) enables us to measure the inevitable discontent 
(or "indignation") of the i-th person (i e &r(f)) with the duty to choose a reasonable 
decision rule (in the sense of Definition 3). 
The set @r(f, (p). The set @r(f, (p) is the set of reasonable dictators that have the 
least inevitable discontent (measured by the function cp). Let us notice that if we 
suppose Q)r(f) # 0, then it is always @r(f, cp) 4= 0. 
4. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
Suppose a zero-sum-three-person game is given and St is the set of pure strategies 
of the i-th person (i = V 2, 3). Suppose St = {1, 2}, S2 = {1,2, 3}, S3 = {1, 2}. 
Then the set of alternatives M will be M = Sx x 5 2 x S 3 . Thus the set M is finite 
and has 12 elements. Let f be a pay-off function of the i-th person (i = 1, 2, 3). 
We shall suppose that the functions f are given by the following table (notice that 
3 
for each (j, k, h) e M it is £ / . ( / , k, h) = 0): 
/ = i 
- V _ ^ s 
-£? .—; <N .-н <N '-< <N т-Ч <N *-< <N 1—1 ГN 
•-* -ч -н <N <N ГП m -н —i <N <N ГO m 
'-í c, w 
1 
o C X2, <N <N <N <N <N <N 
/, 2 1 - 5 0 2 -1 3 4 І 1 
" ~" " 1 
1 
Һ -2 0 2 2 -1 -1 5 -3 -2 -1 1 2 
Һ 0 -1 -3 3 1 1 - 4 0 -2 0 -2 1 ! 
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Let ZT be the discrete topology on 0>(X) and 0>t(X) = {Pt, P2, P3}, where Pt(Bt) = 
= 1, P,(B) = 0 for B 4= Bt for i = 1, 2, 3. The relations Bt e X satisfy the condition 
xBty if and only if ft(x) > ft(y) 
for every x, y e M, 
Let xk e M be an element satisfying the relation 
fk(xk) = max/k(x) 
xeM 
for k = 1,2,3. 
Then xkBky for all y e M. Suppose the utility functions uh i = 1, 2, 3, are defined 
on 0>2{X) = {P., P 2 , P 3 , i P t + i P 2 , i P 2 + i P 3 , 4-P3 + i P . } as follows: 
Ui(Pk) = fi(xk) for i , fe= 1,2,3 
«i(iP* + i A ) = i « ^ t ) + \u{Ph) for i, /i, fc = 1, 2, 3.
2) 
The values of the functions ut in P l 5 P 2 , P 3 are thus given by the following table: 
Pi ?2 
" 1 4 - 1 
u2 - 2 5 
uъ - 2 - 4 
Hence 01-t = {PJ for i = 1, 2, 3. Define the relations -<; as follows: 
P <iQ if and only if ut(P) < u{Q) 
for all P, Q e 0>(X). 
Then the condition (5) is satisfied. 
We have supposed that 0>2(X) = {P1? P2, P3, i P t + iP 2 , \P2 + iP 3 , -}P3 + 
+ i P J . Let the function of discontent / be given by the formula (6) with a t = 1, 
a 2 = L, a 3 = 1. Then the values of/ on th e set ^ 2 ( K ) are given by the following 
table: 
Pl Pi ^з ł Л + ł^2 \Pг + \Pъ ł^з + ł^ l 
ЯP) 5 7 9 6 7 9/2 
Thus we have 
,{X)J) = { ł Р 3 + ł P , ] 
2) It is not important for further considerations how the functions ut are defined outside the 
set &2{X). We do not bring therefore the values of ut on the whole 0(X). 
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Suppose that the election mapping Ft satisfies for all i the condition 
r,-({p,-}) = m + i!M. 
Then 
2>,{f) = {1, 2, 3} . 
Suppose that the function cp is defined by (8) with a1 = a3 = 1, a2 = \. Then the 
values of cp are given by the following table: 
i 1 2 3 
<p(ì) "9/2 ~~ l / 2 ~ "5/2 
So we have 
0 r ( L <?>) = {2, 3} . 
Thus the solution set of the conflict situation under consideration is 
<{ip3+ipx}l {2,3}> . 
5. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Topology 0~. In the example of the preceding paragraph we chose the discrete 
topology on 0(X). There are of course other possibilities of defining a topology 
on the set 0(X), e.g. the topology can be defined with the aid of the metrics Q or gk, 
where Q(P, Q) = max \P(B) - Q(B)\, gk(P, Q) = */ £ |P(#) ~ Q(B)\
k and so on. 
Bex BeX 
If the set M is finite and the metrics O ot gk is introduced on 0(X), then ^(K) with 
the topology given by this metrics is a compact topological Hausdorff space. There 
exists in this case a continuous one-one mapping between the set 0(X) and the 
s 
bounded closed subset {(yi9 y2, ..., ys) | y* = 0, £ y/ = 1} of the s-dimensional 
i=\ 
Euclidean space, where s is the number of elements in X. Thus in this case we can 
have also 0X(X) = 0>(X) or ^2(X) = 0(X). 
The functions f and cp. It is possible to choose other expressions for defining the 
function of discontent / . The theory described above is valid when the function / 
is continuous on 0(X). Some possibilities of defining the function / are: f(P) = 
n 
- ^'(Yjai\ui(p) ~ ui(pd\k) o r f(p) ~ maxo(P. Pf), where O is a metrics on 0>(X) 
i = 1 ieN 
and so on. Analogously the function cp can be defined in a way different from that 
in (8). Various topologies 2T and various forms of the functions / cp lead to various 
mathematical models of conflict situations. 
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The condition $)r(f) 4= 0. Some other (not so idealized) assumptions can be made. 
For instance, we can suppose 
{i | i e N, F^t) S Pt m(0>2(X)J) + (1 - fii) <9i9 Pi e [fi|, 1], Si > 0} * 0 . 
T/ie possible generalization. The model can be easily extended to the case when 
each person i e N has its own set of feasible decision rules, ^k(X), which is compact 
in the topology 3F'. 
Deterministic group preference order. In a special case the set 0l(0>2(X)J) can 
consist only of the elements from 0>2(X), which correspond to deterministic preference 
orders on M. Such a situation will occur if for instance each P e 0*2(X) is in all but 
one elements of X equal to zero. In the numerical example of the previous paragraph 
this will occur for instance if &2(X) = &X(X). 
APPENDIX 
Definition 1A. ( [ l ] , p. 10.) A binary relation -< on a set X is called 
(a) reflective if x -< x for every x e l ; 
(b) symmetric if x -< y => y -< x for every x, y e X; 
(c) asymmetric if x -< y => not y < x for every x, y e X; 
(d) transitive if (x -< y, y -< z) => x -< z for every x, y, z e X; 
(e) negatively transitive if (not x -< y, not y -< z) => not x -< z for every x, y, z e X; 
(f) complete if x -< y or y < x (possibly both) for every x, y e X. 
Definition 2A. ( [ l ] , p. 11.) A binary relation -< on a set X is a weak order on X 
if -< is asymmetric and negatively transitive. 
Definition 3A. ([1], p. 12 — 13.) Binary relations ~ , < are defined as follows: 
x ~ y <=> (not x -< y, not y -< x) for every x, y e X 
x < y <=> (x -< y or x ~ y) for every x j e l . 
Theorem 1A. ([1], p. 13.) Suppose -< on X is a weak order. Then 
(a) exactly one of x -< y, y -< x, x ~ y holds for each x, y e X; 
(b) -< is transitive; 
(c) ~ is an equivalece (i.e. reflexive, symmetric and transitive); 
(d) (x < y, y ~ z) => x -< z, and (x — y, y -< z) => x -< z; 
(e) < is transitive and complete. 
Definition 4A. ([1], p. 105.) A simple probability measure on a given set X is 
a real-valued function P defined on the set of all subsets of X such that 
1. P(A) = 0 for every A c X; 
2. P(X) = 1; 
3. P(A u B) = P(A) + P(B) when A, B c X and A n B = 0; 
4. P(A) = 1 for some finite A c X. 
Theorem 2A. ([1], p. 106.) Suppose P is a simple probability measure on X. Then 
p(x) = 03) for all but a finite number o f x e l and, for all A ^ X, 
R(A) = ZI5W-
xeA 
The set of all simple probability measures on X will be denoted by 0(X). If we 
define the multiplication of elements from 0(X) by a real number and the addition 
of a finite number of elements from 0(X) in the usual way, the following implication 
will hold: 
(P, Q e 0(X), a e <0, 1 » => aP + (1 - a) Q e 0(X) . 
If P is a simple probability measure on X and g is a real-valued function on X, then 
the so-called expected value E(g, P) with respect to P is defined by 
E(g,P) = ^g(x)P(x). 
xeX 
It holds 
E(g, aP + (1 - a) Q) = a F(g, P) + (1 - a) E(g, Q) 
for every a e <0, 1> and every P, Qe 0(X). 
Theorem 3A. ([1], p. 107.) Suppose that 0>(X) is the set of all simple probability 
measures on X and -< is a binary relation on 0(X). Then there is a real-valued 
function u on X that satisfies 
P < QoE(u,P) < E(u, Q) for all P, Q e 0>(X) 
if and only if, for all P,Q,Re 0>(X), 
1. -< on 0(X) is a weak order, 
2. (P -< Q, 0 < a < 1) => aP + (1 - a) R < aQ + (1 - a) R, 
3. (P < Q, Q < R) => aP + (1 - a) R < Q and Q < pP + (1 - ft) R for some 
a,pe(0, 1). 
3) We make use of the notation P({A}) =- P(.v) for all x € X. 
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Moreover, the function u is unique up to a positive linear transformation. 
Remark 1A. The function u from Theorem 3A can be extended to 0>(X) by 
defining u(P) = E(u, P). Then P < Q o u(P) < u(Q) for every P, Q e 0>(X). Let 
us note that if v on 0>(X) is any order-preserving (not necessarily linear) transforma­
tion u, then we have P -< Qo v(P) < v(Q), Given such a v that satisfies the condi­
tion P -< Q o v(P) < v(Q), we can define v on X by v(x) = v(P), when P(x) = 1. 
However, if v is not a linear transformation of u then v(P) 4= E(v, P). 
Theorem 4A. ([1], p. 36.) Suppose a binary relation -< on Y is a weak order. If 
(Y is a topological space (3T is a topology) and there is a real-valued function a 
on Y such that 
(*) N -< y <=> u(x) < u(y) for every x, y eY, 
then there is a real-valued function on Ysatisfying (*) and continuous in the topology 
3T if and only if 
{x | x e Y? x < y} G ST and {x | x e Y, y •< x} e 3~ 
for every y e Y4) 
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Souhrn . 
JEDEN PŘÍSTUP K ŘEŠENÍ KONFLIKTNÍ SITUACE S n ÚČASTNÍKY 
KAREL ZlMMERMANN 
V literatuře bylo již dosti prací věnováno problému řešení konfliktních situací 
s více než dvěma účastníky. Autoři těchto prací se většinou snaží nalézt determi­
nistické preferenční uspořádání alternativ, které je společné pro všechny účastníky 
konfliktní situace a které je v jistém smyslu rozumné nebo přijatelné (např. vyhovuje 
některým z pěti axiomů uvedených v práci [2] nebo [3]). V tomto článku je uveden 
in [1]. 
90 
pokus o nalezení vhodného pravděpodobnostního preferenčního uspořádání alter­
nativ (ve smyslu pravděpodobnostní teorie užitku popsané např. v práci [2]). 
Kriteriem „vhodnosti" je přitom hodnota jisté reálné funkce definované na 
množině všech rozhodovacích pravidel. Je-li P rozhodovací pravidlo, lze hodnotu 
této funkce v bodě P považovat za jistou míru nespokojenosti dané skupiny n účast­
níků konfliktní situace s volbou rozhodovacího pravida P jako závazného předpisu 
pro celou skupinu při posuzování jednotlivých alternativ. Za nejvhodnější se považují 
ta rozhodovací pravidla, která minimalizují hodnotu této funkce na množině pří­
pustných rozhodovacích pravidel. Každé rozhodovací pravidlo přitom jednoznačně 
určuje jisté pravděpodobnostní preferenční uspořádání alternativ. Uvádí se malý 
numerický příklad. Věty a definice převzaté z knihy [1] jsou pro úplnost uvedeny 
v dodatku (Appendix). 
Authoťs address: Dr. Karel Zimmermann, Matematicko-fysikální fakulta KU, Malostranské 
nám. 25, 118 00 Praha 1. 
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